What is intuition in philosophy

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what is intuition in philosophy

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Are You Sure?: Why your intuition might be faultier than you think

Some philosophers equate intuitions with beliefs or with some kind of belief. For example, David Lewis writes,. Our “intuitions” are simply.
Norman Bridwell

Philosophical intuition

Intuition is a feeling or thought you have about something without knowing why you feel that way. Intuition has a complicated role in philosophy and science. On one side, intuition is not a reliable source of information. So intuition is held in some suspicion by philosophy and especially science. However, intuition is also extremely important to science and philosophy.

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Let me give an example. The question is then asked: how would you know, based only on your experience, whether or not you are such a disembodied brain in a vat? As a philosopher, Putnam is rather fond of using these kinds of thought experiments to elicit certain intuitions, though, I have to admit, he usually elicits the "wrong" intuitions in me. In the case of the brain-in-a-vat, the intuition we are supposed to have is that there would be no detectable difference between the experiences of the brain, suitably hooked up and stimulated, and the experiences of a fully embodied person moving about in the world; hence, we cannot escape the radically skeptical conclusion that, for all we know, our perceptions of the world could be completely illusory. Putnam actually comes to an even more radical conclusion, namely that brains-in-vats couldn't even entertain the thought that they might possibly be brains-in-vats, but we'll leave this aside for now. Why suppose intuitions like this are reliable? Regardless of what you think about this particular thought experiment, the bigger point is that appealing to intuitions seems like a bad way to do philosophy.

This entry addresses the nature and epistemological role of intuition by considering the following questions: 1 What are intuitions? Consider the claim that a fully rational person does not believe both p and not- p. Very likely, as you considered it, that claim seemed true to you. Something similar probably happens when you consider the following propositions:. The focus of this entry is intuitions—mental states or events in which a proposition seems true in the manner of these propositions. Some psychological research seems similarly permissive.

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